

Ball State University
International Political Economy
POLITICAL SCIENCE 611-001 – Fall 2021

Online Synchronous

Steven R. Hall
NQ 302
285-4678
srhall@bsu.edu

Mondays, 5:30-8:10 pm Central/6:30-9:10 pm Eastern
8/23/21 - 12/17/21

Office Hours:
MWF 12:00-12:50,
and by appointment

Course Objective: Trade and investment in the international economy are not shaped and directed by market forces alone. Politics both within and between states dramatically alter flows of goods, services, labor, and capital across borders. The welfare implications for the world are enormous. This course examines the political processes that both shape and are shaped by global markets.

Grading and Requirements: Your grade will have three components. First, befitting a core course, the amount of reading assigned is substantial. You will be expected to arrive each evening prepared to discuss each of the articles in detail. Your participation will determine 20% of your grade. As part of this component, students will sign up to serve as discussion leaders for each of the readings. Second, you will prepare and, at the end of the course, present either a policy analysis paper or an academic research proposal on a topic of your choosing. This will determine 40% of your grade. Third, you will take a final exam for 40% of your grade.

Diversity Statement: “Ball State University aspires to be a university that attracts and retains a diverse faculty, staff and student body. We are committed to ensuring that all members of the campus community are welcome through our practice of valuing the various experiences and world views of those we serve. We promote a culture of respect and civil discourse as evident in our [Beneficence Pledge](#). For Bias Incident Response service information, go to bsu.edu/multiculturalcenter/bias or e-mail mc2@bsu.edu.”

Absence: In graduate seminars, absences should be rare. If you miss a class, you are responsible for any work that is assigned that day as well as any material that is covered. I strongly recommend that you schedule a meeting with me to discuss what you missed.

Course Reading: There is no required text for this class. All of the readings will be available either in Ball State Library e-journals and article databases as noted or as PDFs in Canvas. Schedule entries represent readings that should be *completed* by the given day. For those wishing to have a text as a supplement, I recommend Oatley’s book. Any version will do, but I used the page numbers from the 5th edition below for optional readings.

Oatley, Thomas. *International Political Economy: Interests and Institutions in the Global Economy*, 5th edition, New York, NY: Pearson Longman, 2012.

Introduction (8/23)

Frameworks and Approaches (8/30)

Moravcsik, A. (1997). Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics. *International Organization*, 51(4), 513-553. <http://www.jstor.org.proxy.bsu.edu/stable/2703498>

Oatley, T. (2011). The Reductionist Gamble: Open Economy Politics in the Global Economy. *International Organization*, 65(2), 311-341. <http://www.jstor.org.proxy.bsu.edu/stable/23016814>

Lake, D. A. (2009). Open economy politics: A critical review. *The Review of International Organizations*, 4(3), 219-244. <https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs11558-009-9060-y>

Hafner-Burton, E. M., Kahler, M., & Montgomery, A. H. (2009). Network Analysis for International Relations. *International Organization*, 63(3), 559-592. <http://www.jstor.org.proxy.bsu.edu/stable/40345947>

OPTIONAL: Oatley 1-41.

Labor Day – no class (9/6)

Trade: Interest Group Preferences (9/13)

McKeown, Timothy J. (1986). The Limitations of "Structural" Theories of Commercial Policy. *International Organization* 40 (1):43-64 <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2706742>.

Rogowski, Ronald. (1987). Political Cleavages and Changing Exposure to Trade. *The American Political Science Review* 81 (4):1121-1137 <http://www.jstor.org/stable/1962581>.

Alt, J. E., J. Frieden, M. J. Gilligan, D. Rodrik, and R. Rogowski. (1996). The political economy of international trade - Enduring puzzles and an agenda for inquiry. *Comparative Political Studies* 29 (6):689-717.

OPTIONAL: Oatley, 68-78

Trade: Individual Preference Formation (9/20)

Scheve, K. F., & Slaughter, M. J. (2001). What determines individual trade-policy preferences? *Journal of International Economics*, 54(2), 267-292.

Mansfield, E. D., & Mutz, D. C. (2009). Support for free trade: Self-interest, sociotropic politics, and out-group anxiety. *International Organization*, 63(3), 425-457.

Kim, S. E., & Margalit, Y. (2017). Informed Preferences? The Impact of Unions on Workers' Policy Views. *American Journal of Political Science*, 61(3), 728-743. doi:<https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12280>

Trade: Institutions and Ideas (9/27)

Jacobsen, J. K. (1995). Much Ado About Ideas: The Cognitive Factor in Economic Policy. [Ideas, Interests and American Trade Policy, Judith Goldstein; Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions and Political Change, Judith Goldstein, Robert Keohane; International Organization, Peter Haas; Ideas and Institutions: Developmentalism in Brazil and Argentina, Kathryn Sikkink]. *World Politics*, 47(2), 283-310. <http://www.jstor.org.proxy.bsu.edu/stable/2950654>

Bailey, Michael A., Judith Goldstein, and Barry R. Weingast. (1997). The Institutional Roots of American Trade Policy: Politics, Coalitions, and International Trade. *World Politics* 49 (3):309-338 <http://www.jstor.org/stable/25054005>.

Hiscox, Michael J. (1999). The Magic Bullet? The RTAA, Institutional Reform, and Trade Liberalization. *International Organization* 53 (4):669-698 <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2601306>.

Kono, D. Y. (2006). Optimal Obfuscation: Democracy and Trade Policy Transparency. *The American Political Science Review*, 100(3), 369-384. <http://www.jstor.org.proxy.bsu.edu/stable/27644361>

OPTIONAL: Oatley, pp. 89-111.

International Institutions and Trade (10/4)

Rosendorff, B., & Milner, H. (2001). The Optimal Design of International Trade Institutions: Uncertainty and Escape. *International Organization*, 55(4), 829-857. Retrieved from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3078617>

Goldstein, J., Rivers, D., & Tomz, M. (2007). Institutions in International Relations: Understanding the Effects of the GATT and the WTO on World Trade. *International Organization*, 61(1), 37-67. Retrieved from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/4498137>

Davis, C. L. (2004). International Institutions and Issue Linkage: Building Support for Agricultural Trade Liberalization. *American Political Science Review*, 98(1), 153-169. doi:10.1017/S0003055404001066

Steinberg, R. (2002). In the Shadow of Law or Power? Consensus-Based Bargaining and Outcomes in the GATT/WTO. *International Organization*, 56(2), 339-374. Retrieved from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3078608>

FALL BREAK – no class (10/11)

Exchange Rates: Systems Theory (10/18)

Benjamin J. Cohen, "A Brief History of the International Monetary System," in Jeffrey A. Frieden and David A. Lake, eds., *International Political Economy*, 4th edition (New York: Wadsworth Publishing, 1999).

Obstfeld, Maurice, and Alan M. Taylor. 2017. "International Monetary Relations: Taking Finance Seriously." *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 31 (3): 3-28.

Barry Eichengreen, "Hegemonic Stability Theories of the International Monetary System," in Jeffrey A. Frieden and David A. Lake, eds., *International Political Economy*, 4th edition (New York: Wadsworth Publishing, 1999).

Benjamin J. Cohen, "The Triad and the Unholy Trinity: Problems of International Monetary Cooperation," in Jeffrey A. Frieden and David A. Lake, eds., *International Political Economy*, 4th edition (New York: Wadsworth Publishing, 1999).

OPTIONAL: Oatley, pp. 214-236.

Exchange Rates: Domestic Politics (10/25)

Broz, J. L., & Frieden, J. A. (2001). The political economy of international monetary relations. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 4, 317-343.

Frieden, Jeffrey A. (1991). Invested Interests: The Politics of National Economic Policies in a World of Global Finance. *International Organization* 45 (4):425-451 <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2706944>

Bernhard, William, and David Leblang. (1999). Democratic Institutions and Exchange-Rate Commitments. *International Organization* 53 (1):71-97 <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2601372>.

OPTIONAL: Oatley, pp. 259-306.

Capital Mobility: How and Why? (11/1)

Verdier, Daniel. (2001). Capital Mobility and the Origins of Stock Markets. *International Organization* 55 (2):327-356 <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3078634>.

Quinn, Dennis P., and Carla Inclan. (1997). The Origins of Financial Openness: A Study of Current and Capital Account Liberalization. *American Journal of Political Science* 41 (3):771-813 <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2111675>.

Haggard, Stephan, and Sylvia Maxfield. (1996). The Political Economy of Financial Internationalization in the Developing World. *International Organization* 50 (1):35-68 <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2706998>.

Goodman, John B., and Louis W. Pauly. (1993). The Obsolescence of Capital Controls?: Economic Management in an Age of Global Markets. *World Politics* 46 (1):50-82 <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2950666>.

OPTIONAL: Oatley, pp. 237-258.

Capital Mobility: Policy Autonomy? (11/8)

Rudra, N. (2002). Globalization and the Decline of the Welfare State in Less-Developed Countries. *International Organization* 56(2), 411-445. doi: 10.2307/3078610.

Mosley, Layna. (2000). Room to Move: International Financial Markets and National Welfare States. *International Organization* 54 (4):737-773 <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2601380>.

Oatley, Thomas. (1999). How Constraining is Capital Mobility? The Partisan Hypothesis in an Open Economy. *American Journal of Political Science* 43 (4):1003-1027 <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2991815>.

Capital Mobility: Managing Contagion (11/15)

Frieden, J., & Walter, S. (2017). Understanding the political economy of the Eurozone crisis. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 20.

- Schularick, Moritz, and Alan M. Taylor. 2012. "Credit Booms Gone Bust: Monetary Policy, Leverage Cycles, and Financial Crises, 1870-2008." *American Economic Review*, 102 (2): 1029-61.
- Posner, E. (2009). Making Rules for Global Finance: Transatlantic Regulatory Cooperation at the Turn of the Millennium. *International Organization* 63(4), 665-699. doi: 10.1017/s0020818309990130.
- Singer, D.A. (2004). Capital Rules: The Domestic Politics of International Regulatory Harmonization. *International Organization* 58(3), 531-565. doi: 10.2307/3877842.

Foreign Direct Investment (11/22)

- Pandya, S. S. (2016). Political Economy of Foreign Direct Investment: Globalized Production in the Twenty-First Century. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 19(1), 455-475. doi:10.1146/annurev-polisci-051214-101237
- Malesky, E. J., & Mosley, L. (2018). Chains of Love? Global Production and the Firm-Level Diffusion of Labor Standards. *American Journal of Political Science*, 62(3), 712-728. doi:https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12370
- Johns, L., & Wellhausen, R. L. (2016). Under One Roof: Supply Chains and the Protection of Foreign Investment. *American Political Science Review*, 110(1), 31-51. doi:10.1017/S000305541500057X

Political Economy of Development (11/29)

- Haggard, S., & MacIntyre, A. (1998). The Political Economy of the Asian Economic Crisis. *Review of International Political Economy*, 5(3), 381-392. Retrieved from www.jstor.org/stable/4177277
- Acemoglu, D., Johnson, S., & Robinson, J. A. (2001). The colonial origins of comparative development: An empirical investigation. *American Economic Review*, 91(5), 1369-1401.
- Steinwand, M. C., & Stone, R. W. (2008). The International Monetary Fund: A review of the recent evidence. *The Review of International Organizations*, 3(2), 123-149. doi:10.1007/s11558-007-9026-x

Political Economy of Migration (12/6)

- Bermeo, S. B., & Leblang, D. (2015). Migration and Foreign Aid. *International Organization*, 69(3), 627-657. doi:10.1017/S0020818315000119
- Peters, M. E. (2015). Open Trade, Closed Borders Immigration in the Era of Globalization. *World Politics*, 67(1), 114-154. doi:10.1017/S0043887114000331
- Hainmueller, J., & Hiscox, M. J. (2010). Attitudes toward Highly Skilled and Low-skilled Immigration: Evidence from a Survey Experiment. *American Political Science Review*, 104(1), 61-84. doi:10.1017/S0003055409990372

FINAL EXAM: 6:30-9:10 Monday, December 13th